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Abstract
The purpose of this note is to explain theoretically the observed entire density
of wages which is hump-shaped and right-skewed. I extend the model brought up
by Halko et al : (2008) to introduce heterogeneity of ¯rm's productivity. It causes
a di®erence in the support of wage o®ers, a wider (narrower) range for high (low)
productivity ¯rms. The di®erent support roughly results in the observed wage
dispersion because low wage o®ers are made by all ¯rms (right-skewed), whereas
high wage o®ers are made by only high producivity ¯rms.
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1 Introduction
Many studies have attempted to explain the shape of empirically observed wage density
which is hump-shaped and right-skewed. The aim of this note is also to construct
a model which can explain empirically observed wage density which is hump-shaped
and right-skewed, and suggest an intuitive explanation why such a shape is formed.
Bontemps et al : (2000) assumes a continuous distribution of ¯rm productivity types
and derives hump-shaped wage density. Julien et al : (2006) makes ¯rm's productivity
endogenous by selecting either high or low levels. In the latter model, workers' wage
can di®er even if they are employed by the same job according to the number of o®er
they are made. Halko et al : (2008), which is closed to this note, considers a model that
there is a market in which only ¯rms make a wage o®er (wage o®er market), in which
only workers make a wage o®er (wage demand market), and in which the two markets
coexist. In their model, which situation occurs depends on the vacancy-unemployment
ratio. In particular, hump-shaped is derived due to wage o®er market whereas right-
skewed is mainly due to wage demand market. In the actual economy, however, most
wage level would be determined by ¯rms (with a few exceptions, for example, labor
union's wage negotiation).
The main contribution of this note is that I exhibit a quite simple model that shows
the observed wage distribution and intuitive explanation using by \ wage o®er market"
as in Halko et al : (2008), so the wage level in this note is determined by ¯rms only. In
the market ¯rms randomize over the workers and o®er a wage using a mixed strategy
with a cumulative distribution function. Unlike Halko et al : (2008), I assume that, as
in Julien et al : (2006), ¯rm's productivity is two types but it is exogenous in this note.
This productivity di®erence leads to long-tail in the wage o®er market. Introducting
the di®erence in productivity to the model constructed by Halko et al : (2008), the
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variant support of wage o®er between high and low productivity ¯rms is led since high
productivity ¯rms can make a higher wage o®er than low productivity ¯rms. Given
the fact, both high and low productivity ¯rms can make a low wage o®er but only high
productivity ¯rms can o®er a high wage. Hence the upper bound of the support for high
productivity ¯rms is wider than for low productivity ¯rms, which leads to high density
within low wage o®ers and low density within high wage o®ers. By using the theoretical
model, I show numerical results and intuitive exlpanations of empirically observed wage
density. The model predicts that, as the fraction of high productivity ¯rm increases, the
skewedness is enhanced whereas as the productivity di®erence decreases, the skewedness
is weakened.
The rest of note is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the theoretical model.
Numerical analysis of the model and intuitive explanations are shown in section 3 and
section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a static labor market in which ¯rms with a vacancy measured by v send a wage
o®er and unemployed workers measured by u receive the o®er(s). Each vacancy can
hire at most one worker and o®ers a wage using a mixed strategy. Each worker chooses
the highest o®er and can not make any counter o®er. Firm's productivity is either
high pH or low pL, (pH > pL > 0), and the fraction of high productivity in aggregate
vacancy is indicated by ® 2 (0; 1). As in Halko et al : (2008), the Poisson rate under
which ¯rms randomly make an o®er to workers is µ ´ v=u, the vacancy-unemployment
rate. Throughout this note, I take this value as given.
Let Gi(¢) be a cumulative distribution function of wage o®er by type i ¯rm with
support wi 2 [wi; wi] and Vi an expected value of type i vacancy. Since workers accept
the highest wage o®er, the expected value of type L vacancy that makes a wage o®er
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w is given by
VL = e




(pL ¡ w)[GL(w)]k + ¢ ¢ ¢







= (pL ¡ w)e¡(1¡®)µ(1¡GL(w)): (1)
Interpretation of this expression is as follows: when a ¯rm o®ering w meets a certain
worker and no other ¯rms make an o®er to the worker, then this ¯rm hires this worker
and obtains the gain pL¡w. When the ¯rm competes against another ¯rm for a certain
worker, this ¯rm hires the worker and obtain the gain if the competitor bids a smaller
wage o®er than w (GL(w)). In general, when the ¯rm competes with k ¯rms, this ¯rm
obtains the worker if it o®ers the highest wage ([GL(w)]
k). Analogously, the expected
value of type H vacancy that bids a wage w is
VH = (pH ¡ w)e¡®µ(1¡GH(w)): (2)
Since ¯rm's o®er is determined by a mixed strategy, it must be indi®erence between
the highest o®er and the lowset o®er. For type H, the expected value o®ering the lowest
o®er wH , (1 ¡ wH)e¡®µ(1¡GH(wH)), equals to the expected value with the highest o®er
wH , (1¡wH)e¡®µ(1¡GH(wH)). Note that wH = 0 since if no other ¯rms make an o®er to
a certain worker, this ¯rm can hire the worker with no payment. Given GH(wH) = 0,
GH(wH) = 1 and wH = 0, the highest o®er for type H ¯rm is wH = pH(1 ¡ e¡®µ).
By similar procedure, I obtain the highest o®er for type L ¯rm, wL = pL[1¡ e¡(1¡®)µ].
Note that the support of type H wage o®er, wH 2 [0; wH ], is wider than that of type
L, wL 2 [0; wL], if the di®erence of productivity is su±ciently large, pHpL > 1¡e
¡(1¡®)µ
1¡e¡®µ
1. Hereafter, I focus on this case. From (1) and (2), the wage distribution function
1It can be easily shown that lim®!0 1¡e
¡(1¡®)µ
1¡e¡®µ ! +1 and lim®!1 1¡e
¡(1¡®)µ
1¡e¡®µ ! 0. So the condition
is satis¯ed for almost all values of pH=pL.
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pH¡wH with support wH 2 [0; wH ], respectively. Note that, as in Halko
et al : (2008), the density functions are increasing in w (G0i(wi) > 0 for i = H;L).
Next I will derive the aggregate wage o®er distribution. Note that both type L and
type H ¯rms make an o®er in the range of w 2 [0; wL]. Let ¯ be the fraction in overall
type H. By de¯nition, ¯ = GH(wL) can be easily derived as follows:
¯ = (®µ)¡1P; where P ´ ln pH
pH ¡ pL[1¡ e¡(1¡®)µ] :
Since the fraction of type H ¯rm is ®, in aggregate, 1¡ ® type L ¯rm and ®¯ type H
¯rm make an wage o®er in the range of w 2 [0; wL] and ®(1¡ ¯) type H ¯rm does in

























; for w 2 [wL; wH ]:
Note that, in general, this distribution does not consist with the \realized" wage
distribution since not all the o®ers are accepted: a worker who receives multiple o®ers
chooses only the highest one. So an o®ered wage is rejected if a competitor bids a







[G(w)]k, which is the probability that the highest o®er, conditional on
the worker receiving at least one o®er, is at most w. Substituting G(w) for ~G(w), I
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; for w 2 [wL; wH ]:
(3)
As noted above, since not all o®ers are accepted, it can be easily con¯rmed that ~G(0) = 0
but ~G(wH) < 1
3.
3 Numerical Analysis
In this section I show numerical results of the realized wage distribution (3). Note
that parameters must satisfy the condition that the support of high productivity ¯rm




1¡e¡®µ . As a benchmark, I set the
parameters as follows: pH = 1:0 (normalized) and pL = 0:1, µ = 1:2, and ® = 0:1. Thus
there is su±cient productivity di®erence (pH
pL
> 10:0) and vacancy-unemployment ratio
is larger than one (µ = 1:2), which is empirically observed (e.g., Hall, 2005). Figure 1
shows the realized wage distribution under benchmark parameters. As mentioned above,
since both type H and type L ¯rms make an wage o®er in the range of w 2 [0; wL],
the density is substantially high than in the range of w 2 [wL; wH ] where only type H
¯rms o®er. Note also since each of the wage density functions are increasing in w, the
aggregate density function is increasing within w 2 [0; wL] and w 2 [wL; wH ].
One may claim that degeneration of the aggregate density function is questionable
(since empirically observed distribution does not degenerate) and that it does not have





































for w 2 [0; wL]. The arrange-
ment of this expression and analogous calculation for w 2 [wL; wH ] yields the result.
3Substitution wH = pH(1 ¡ e¡®µ) into ~G(w) for w 2 [wL; wH ] yields ~G(wH) = e¡[(1¡®)µ+P ]¡e¡µ1¡e¡µ .
Since ¡[(1¡ ®)µ + P ] < 0, ~G(wH) is de¯nitely smaller than one.
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a long-tail (since the function is increasing in right-hand edge), however, they would
not be problematic. Consider a general case in which there are k di®erent types of
productivity 0 < p1 < p2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < pk < +1 and the fraction of type i is denoted by ®i
(
Pk
i=1 ®i = 1). From discussion in the previous section, a ¯rm with higher productivity
has wider support of wage o®er. Let si be the support of ¯rm with productivity i (s1 <
s2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < sk) and ni be the number of ¯rms which make an o®er within the support
si. Recalling that the total number of ¯rms (vacancies) is v, ni is determined by ni =
v
Pk
j=i ®j and n1 > n2 > ¢ ¢ ¢ > nk. Assuming that the fraction of high productivity ¯rms
is relatively less than low roductivity ¯rms, a similar shape of wage density function
would be obtained in the model with k di®erent types of productivity and degeneration
would be moderately improved. In the extreme case in which productivity heterogeneity
is continuous as in Bontemps et al : (2000), the analogous discussion is applied and
degeneration would not arise. Analogous discussions justify an increasing tail. The
aggregate wage density is weighted with the measure of ¯rm with productivity i, ®i.
Consequently, in the k types model, the measure is generally small in right-hand edge
of the entire wage density, which would lead to non-increasing (or decreasing) tail in
aggregate.








Figure 1: benchmark case
(® = 0:2; µ = 1:2; pH = 1:0; pL = 0:1)
Next I examine the e®ect of change in ® and productivity di®erence. Figure 2 shows
7
the results under various values of ® (the other parameters are the same as benchmark
case). It suggests that as the fraction of type H ¯rm increases, the skewedness is
enhanced: that is, the density in low wage o®ers is decreased and the long tail is
lengthened. The intuition is straightforward. Given the productivity di®erence pH=pL,
increase in ® makes type H ¯rms more apt to o®er a high wage because competitors for
them increase. To make sure that they hires a worker, they must make a high wage o®er.
Justi¯cation of degeneration and increasing tail is same as the above discussion. Finally
the e®ect of change in productivity di®erence, under which pH is held constant and pL
is increased, is in Figure 3. It shows that as the productivity di®erence decreases, the
skewedness is weakened. The intuition is also straightforward. Given the component
ratio of productivity ®, this is because increase in pL widens the support of wage o®er
for type L ¯rms whereas the support for type H ¯rms. Brie°y speaking, increase
(decrease) in ® enhances (weakens) the right skewedness whereas decrease (increase) in
productivity di®erence weakens (enhances) the skewedness 4.
From the numerical results, some predictions are obtained regarding the real econ-
omy: (i) there is substantial di®erence in productivity among ¯rms; (ii) the fraction of
high productivity is very small; (iii) many high productivity ¯rms o®er a low wage in
spite of they can a®ord to make a high wage due to randomizing over workers.
























Figure 2: change in ®
4These results are conditional on pHpL >
1¡e¡(1¡®)µ
1¡e¡®µ holds. If the condition does not satisfy, a situation
in which type L ¯rms have wider support than type H ¯rms may arise, so the skewedness is not de¯ned
(for instance, ® is close to 0).
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(µ = 1:2; pH = 1:0; pL = 0:1)

























Figure 3: change in productivity di®erence
(® = 0:2; µ = 1:2; pH = 1:0)
4 Conclusion
This note have explored the theoretical model explains empirically observed wage dis-
tribution. It shows that the right skewedness and long tail can be explained by two
reasons: First, both high and low productivity make a low wage o®er due to random-
izing over workers. Second, only high productivity (can) make a high wage o®er. The
model predicts that, as the fraction of high productivity ¯rm increases, the skewedness is
enhanced whereas as the productivity di®erence decreases, the skewedness is weakened.
In this note, I have shown a theoretical model that can explain the actual wage
distribution but not shown the empirically observed wage distributions. As further
tasks, I shall cite the empirical distributions and explain why such a distribution occurs.
For instance, following my theoretical model, a contributing factor of a high degree
hump-shaped is predicted as a large ratio of low productivity ¯rms. As another example,
a longer tail seems to be derived by a large productivity di®erence. To prove right of
my theoretical model, I shall show some empirical facts that exhibit the ratio of high
and low productivity ¯rms, the size of productivity di®erence, and so on.
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